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Abstract. Extended private information retrieval (EPIR) was defined by [6] at CANS’07
and generalized by [5] at AFRICACRYPT’09. In the generalized setting, EPIR allows a
user to evaluate a function on a database block such that the database can learn neither
which function has been evaluated nor on which block the function has been evaluated
and the user learns no more information on the database blocks except for the expected
result. An EPIR protocol for evaluating polynomials over a finite field L was proposed by
Bringer and Chabanne in [5]. We show that the protocol does not satisfy the correctness
requirement as they have claimed. In particular, we show that it does not give the user
the expected result with large probability if one of the coefficients of the polynomial to be
evaluated is primitive in L and the others belong to the prime subfield of L.
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1 Introduction
Extended private information retrieval (EPIR) was motivated by privacy-preserving
biometric authentication and formally defined in [6]. It enables a user to privately
evaluate a fixed and public function with two inputs, one chosen block from a
database and one additional string. Two EPIR protocols were proposed in [6].
One is for testing equality and the other is for computing weighted Hamming dis-
tance. As a cryptographic primitive, EPIR has been generalized by [5] in order
to attain more flexibility. In the generalized setting, the function to be evaluated
is neither fixed nor public. Instead, it is chosen from a set of public functions by
the user. A new EPIR protocol in the generalized setting was proposed in [5]. As
noted in [6], EPIR is indeed a combination of private informatrion retrieval [12]
and general secure two-party computation [18].
Related Work. Private information retrieval (PIR) was introduced by [12]. It
allows a user to retrieve a data item from a database such that the database can-
not learn which item the user is interested in. The requirement on the privacy of
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the identity of the retrieved data item is called user privacy. The main measure
of the efficiency of a PIR protocol is its communication complexity, i.e., the total
number of bits exchanged by the user and the database for retrieving a single bit.
PIR protocols have been constructed in both the information-theoretic setting [1–
3,10,12,13,21,29,31] and the computational setting [7,9,11,16,20,23,24,26,30].
In an information-theoretic PIR protocol, the database learns absolutely no infor-
mation on which item the user is interested in even if it has unlimited computing
power. On the other hand, in a computational PIR (CPIR) protocol, the identity
of the retrieved data item is not revealed only if the database is polynomial-time
and cannot efficiently solve certain number-theoretic problems, i.e., certain crypto-
graphic assumptions hold. For example, the PIR protocol of [11] is a two-database
CPIR protocol in which each database cannot figure out which item the user is in-
terested in under the assumption that one way functions exist. EPIR protocols
of [5, 6] are mostly close to the single-database CPIR protocols. The first single-
database CPIR protocol was proposed by [23]. It achieves the user privacy under
the assumption that deciding quadratic residuosity is hard and has communica-
tion complexity O(N c) for any small constant c > 0, where N is the size of
the database. Subsequently, [7] constructed a single-database CPIR protocol of
communication complexity O(log8(N)) under the Φ-hiding assumption. So far,
the most efficient single-database CPIR protocol was obtained by [16] under the
assumption that the decision subgroup problem is hard. It requires the user to ex-
change O(k + d) bits with the database for retrieving d bits, where k ≥ logN is
the security parameter. Other constructions of single-database CPIR protocols can
be found in [9, 20, 24, 30].
PIR does not provide any privacy for the database. Typically, the user may
obtain a large number of data items in an execution of a PIR protocol. In order to
prevent the user from obtaining more than one data item in any execution of a PIR
protocol, [17] introduced the notion of data privacy and proposed transformations
from information-theoretic PIR protocols to the so-called symmetrically private
information retrieval (SPIR) protocols which meet the data privacy. The SPIR
protocols of [17] are in the information-theoretic setting. SPIR can be defined
in the computational setting as well. Following the security definition of general
secure two-party and multi-party computation [18], in the computational setting, a
PIR protocol is said to achieve data privacy if, for any query, the user cannot tell
whether it is interacting with a real-database which has N data items or a simulator
which only knows the retrieved data item. Interestingly, single-database SPIR
protocols in the computational setting are essentially communication-efficient 1-
out-of-N Oblivious transfer (OT) [4, 14, 19, 22, 28] protocols. Oblivious transfer
[28] is a fundamental cryptographic primitive, on which any secure two-party and
multi-party computation can be built [22] in an unconditionally secure way. A 1-
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out-of-N OT allows a receiver Bob to choose one of the N secrets held by a sender
Alice such that Alice learns no information on Bob’s choice and Bob cannot learn
more except the secret he chooses. [27] proposed transformations from any PIR
protocols to SPIR protocols in the computational setting. Their transformation
requires only one execution of a given PIR protocol and logN executions of a 1-
out-of-2 OT protocol. The notion of EPIR [5, 6] is essentially a generalization of
SPIR in the computational setting.
EPIR is also related to selective private function evaluation [8], oblivious poly-
nomial evaluation [27] and private keyword search [15]. A selective private func-
tion evaluation protocol [8] allows a client to privately evaluate a public function
on the inputs held by one or more servers. Comparing with EPIR, the client only
decides on which inputs the public function will be evaluated. An oblivious poly-
nomial evaluation protocol [27] allows a receiver to privately evaluate a polyno-
mial function on his input, where the polynomial is held by a sender. Comparing
with EPIR, the function to be evaluated is not known to the receiver and the input
on which the function is evaluated is not known to the sender. A private keyword
search protocol [15] allows a client to privately search a database with a keyword
such that he learns the associated record if the keyword is contained in the database
and learns nothing otherwise. In a sense, EPIR can also be seen as a generalization
of the above problems.
Results. The protocol described in Section 4.3 of [5] will be our main topic in
this paper and termed as Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol from now on. It was
claimed [5] that the protocol enables a user to privately evaluate any polynomial
F (t) ∈ L[t] on a chosen database block Ri, where L = GF(pn) is the field
extension of degree n of the prime field K = GF(p). We study the correctness
of the Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol and show that it may fail frequently. In
particular, we show that, by executing the protocol, the user with input (F (t), i) ∈
L[t]× [N ] does not learn the expected result (i.e., F (Ri)) with a large probability
if F (t) ∈ P , where P = {f(t) =
∑d
k=0 fkt
k : ∃ 0 ≤ l ≤ d such that fl ∈
L is of order pn − 1 and fk ∈ K for every k 6= l}.
Methodology. Our argument is by contradiction. To simplify the argument, we
first give a restricted version of the Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol. In the re-
stricted version, the database is deterministic and only has one block, i.e., N = 1.
We note that if the Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol satisfies the correctness re-
quirement, then so does the restricted version. We then show that the restricted
version does not satisfy the correctness requirement if the polynomial to be eval-
uated is in P . This result allows us to conclude that the Bringer-Chabanne EPIR
protocol does not satisfy the correctness requirement as [5] has claimed.
Organization. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, we recall the definition and security model of EPIR [5]. In Section 3, we recall
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the Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol. In Section 4, we give a restricted version
of the Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol and show that the restricted version fails
frequently if the polynomial to be evaluated is in P . At last, in Section 5, we
conclude the paper.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Definition
Following the definition of [5], a single-database EPIR protocol is a protocol be-
tween a database DB who has N blocks (R1, . . . , RN ) ∈ ({0, 1}l1 )N and a user
U who wants to evaluate F (Ri) for a function F ∈ F and an index i ∈ [N ], where
F is a set of functions from {0, 1}l1 to {0, 1}∗ and public. Such a protocol allows
U to learn F (Ri) but no more information on the database blocks while DB learns
no information on (F, i).
The above definition of EPIR is a generalization of [6] and provides the user
with more flexibility of choosing the function F from a large set F . In the context
of this definition, the EPIR for testing equality [6] has F = {IsEqual(·,X) :
X ∈ {0, 1}l1}, where IsEqual(Ri,X) = 1 if Ri = X and 0 otherwise. The
EPIR for computing weighted Hamming distance [6] has F = {dw(·,X) : X ∈
{0, 1}l1 , w ∈ Nl1}, where dw(Ri,X) =
∑l1
j=1 wj · (R
(j)
i ⊕ X
(j)) (For every
j ∈ [l1], R
(j)
i and X(j) are the j-th bits of Ri and X , respectively).
2.2 Security Model
As in [5, 6], we denote by retrieve(F, i) the query made by a user with in-
put (F, i) ∈ F × [N ]. Without further notice, algorithms are assumed to be
polynomial-time. If an algorithm A runs in k stages, then we shall write A =
(A1,A2, . . . ,Ak). The security is evaluated by an experiment between an attacker
and a challenger, where the challenger simulates the protocol executions and an-
swers the attacker’s oracle queries. For A a probabilistic algorithm, we denote
by A(O, retrieve) the action to run A with access to any polynomial number
of retrieve queries generated or answered (depending on the position of the at-
tacker) by the oracle O. A function τ : Z → R is said to be negilible if for any
polynomial P , there is an integerNP such that τ (n) ≤ 1/P (n) for every n ≥ NP .
If τ (n) is negilible, then 1− τ (n) is said to be overwhelming.
Correctness. An EPIR protocol is said to be correct if any query retrieve(F, i)
returns the correct value of F (Ri) with an overwhelming probability when U and
DB follow the protocol specification.
User Privacy. Informally, an EPIR protocol is said to respect user privacy if for
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any query retrieve(F, i), DB learns no information on (F, i). Formally, an EPIR
protocol is said to respect user privacy if any attacker A = (A1,A2,A3,A4), act-
ing as a malicious database, has only a negligible advantage |Pr[b′ = b]− 12 | in the
following experiment:
Exp
user-privacy
A∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(R1, . . . , RN ) ← A1(1l)
1 ≤ i0, i1 ≤ N ;F0, F1 ∈ F ← A2(Challenger; retrieve)
b ← {0, 1}
∅ ← A3(Challenger; retrieve(Fb, ib))
b′ ← A4(Challenger; retrieve)
Database Privacy. Informally, an EPIR protocol is said to respect database pri-
vacy if a malicious user U cannot learn more information than F ′(Ri′) for some
(F ′, i′) ∈ F × [N ] via a query retrieve. This intuitive description can be formal-
ized via simulation principle by saying that the user U cannot determine whether
he is interacting with a simulator which takes only (i′, F ′(Ri′)) as input, or with
DB. We denote by S0 the database DB. Formally, an EPIR protocol is said to re-
spect database privacy if there is a simulator S1, which receives an auxiliary input
(i′, F ′(Ri′)) from a hypothetical oracleO for every query retrieve, such that any
attackerA = (A1,A2), acting as a malicious user, has only a negligible advantage
|Pr[b′ = b]− 12 | in the following experiment:
Exp
database-privacy
A∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
b ← {0, 1}
(R1, . . . , RN ) ← A1(1l)
b′ ← A2(Sb; retrieve)
Remark: The hypothetical oracle O is assumed to have unlimited computing re-
sources, and S1 always learns exactly the input related to the request made by the
attacker.
3 Bringer-Chabanne EPIR Protocol
The EPIR protocols for testing equality and computing weighted Hamming dis-
tance of [6] are based on a pre-processing technique. Specifically, the user sends
an encryption of its input (F, i) to DB, who then computes a temporary database
which contains an encryption of F (Ri). Finally, the user executes a single-database
CPIR protocol with DB to retrieve the encryption of F (Ri). This technique does
not allow the evaluation of generic functions and incurs heavy computation during
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the computation of the temporary database. The Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol
aims to avoid these deficiencies. It is based on ElGamal encryption schemes over
the multiplicative groups of finite fields.
3.1 ElGamal Encryption Scheme
Let p be a prime and K = GF(p) be the finite field of order p. Let L = GF(pn)
be the finite field of order pn and G = L× be its multiplicative group of order
q = pn − 1 for an integer n ≥ 2. Let g be a generator of G. The ElGamal
encryption scheme overG is a triplet of algorithms Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec), where
(i) Gen is a key generation algorithm which takes as input a security parameter
1k and proceeds as follows:
a. generates the parameters p, n, q and g;
b. picks x← Zq and computes y = gx;
c. outputs pk = (q, g, y) as the public key and sk = x as the secret key.
(ii) Enc is an encryption algorithm which takes as input a plaintext m ∈ G,
picks r← Zq and outputs c = (gr, yrm) as the ciphertext.
(iii) Dec is a decryption algorithm which takes as input a ciphertext c = (c1, c2) ∈
G2 and outputs c2 · c−x1 .
3.2 Requirements on Database Blocks and Functions
Following the notations in Section 3.1, let α ∈ L be a primitive element of the
field extension L/K. Then there is a polynomial G(t) ∈ K[t] of degree < n such
that G(α) = g. Let x ∈ Zq and Y (t) ∈ K[t] be the polynomial of degree < n
such that Y (α) = y = gx.
For the Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol to be correct, it is required in [5] that
for every j ∈ [N ], the database block Rj should belong to D, where
D = {β ∈ G : Y (β) = G(β)x and G(β) 6= 0}.
The function to be evaluated by U can be any polynomial over L, i.e., F = L[t].
3.3 Bringer-Chabanne EPIR Protocol
Figure 1 is the Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol, where most notations are adopted
from Section 3.1 and Section 3.2. The authors of the protocol expect to embed the
description of the polynomial F (t) ∈ L[t] chosen by U into an ElGamal ciphertext
such that it can be evaluated by DB in an oblivious way.
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(i) U : Generates an ElGamal key pair (pk, sk), where pk = (q, g, y), y =
gx, and sk = x is randomly chosen from Zq. U also sends pk to letDB
the possibility to verify the validity of pk as an ElGamal public key. In
practice, the validity of pk can be certified by a TTP, and the same pk
can be used by the user for all his queries.
(ii) U : For any polynomial function F : GF(pn) → GF(pn) and any index
1 ≤ i ≤ N , computes C1, . . . , CN and sends them to DB where
- Ci = Enc(F (α) + r) = (G(α)
ri , Y (α)ri(F (α) + r))
- and Cj = Enc(1) = (G(α)rj , Y (α)rj ) for all j 6= i,
with randomly chosen r ∈ GF(p), rj ∈ Zq(1 ≤ j ≤ N). Each Cj can
be written as Cj = (Vj(α),Wj(α)) where Vj and Wj are polynomial
over GF(p) of degree at most n− 1.
(iii) DB: After reception of the Cj , checks that they are nontrivial ElGamal
ciphertexts and computes Cj(Rj) = (Vj(Rj),Wj(Rj)) by replacing
each occurrence of α (resp. αl for all power l < n) with Rj (resp. with
Rlj).
(iv) DB: Performs the product of all the Cj together with a random encryp-
tion of 1, say Enc(1) = (gr′ , yr′), sends Enc(1) ×
∏N
j=1 Cj(Rj) =(
gr
′∏N
j=1 G(Rj)
rj , yr
′
(∏N
j=1 Y (Rj)
rj
)
(F (Ri) + r)
)
to U .
(v) U : Outputs Dec(sk,Enc(1)∏Nj=1 Cj(Rj))− r as F (Ri).
Figure 1. Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol
The correctness of the Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol was claimed in [5] as
follows.
Claim 3.1. (Section 4.4 of [5]) A query (say retrieve(F, i)) gives the expected
result (i.e., F (Ri)) as soon as there is no index j for which one of the values
G(Rj) or Y (Rj) is zero, which may occur only with a negligible probability in
practice, leading to the correctness of the EPIR protocol.
4 On the Incorrectness of Bringer-Chabanne EPIR Protocol
In this section, we show that Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol does not satisfy
the correctness requirement defined in Section 2.2. To simplify the argument, we
give a restricted version of Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol in which DB is de-
terministic and N = 1. The restricted version satisfies the correctness requirement
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as long as Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol satisfies the correctness requirement.
Then we turn to study the incorrectness of the restricted version.
4.1 Restricted Version
At step (iv) of the Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol, DB is randomizing the prod-
uct
∏N
j=1 Cj(Rj) and sending Enc(1) ·
∏N
j=1 Cj(Rj) to the user. We note that
the user could have computed the same output if DB merely sends
∏N
j=1 Cj(Rj).
Therefore, we can safely modify step (iv) such thatDBmerely sends∏Nj=1 Cj(Rj)
to U with no impact on the correctness of the protocol. Let i = N = 1. Then we
have the restricted version (see Figure 2).
(i) U : Generates an ElGamal key pair (pk, sk), where pk = (q, g, y), y =
gx, and sk = x is randomly chosen from Zq. U also sends pk to letDB
the possibility to verify the validity of pk as an ElGamal public key. In
practice, the validity of pk can be certified by a TTP, and the same pk
can be used by the user for all his queries.
(ii) U : For any polynomial function F : GF(pn) → GF(pn), computes
C = Enc(F (α) + r) = (G(α)s, Y (α)s(F (α) + r)) and sends it to
DB where r ∈ GF(p), s ∈ Zq are randomly chosen. The ciphertext C
can be written as C = (V (α),W (α)) where V and W are polynomials
over GF(p) of degree at most n− 1.
(iii) DB: After reception of C , checks that it is a nontrivial ElGamal ci-
phertext and computes C(R) = (V (R),W (R)) by replacing each oc-
currence of α (resp. αl for all power l < n) with R (resp. with Rl).
(iv) DB: Sends C(R) to U .
(v) U : Outputs Dec(sk,C(R))− r as F (R).
Figure 2. A restricted version of Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol
Clearly, if Claim 3.1 holds, then we have:
Claim 4.1. A query (say retrieve(F, 1)) in an execution of the restricted version
gives U the expected result (i.e., F (R)) for any R ∈ G satisfying Y (R) = G(R)x
and G(R) 6= 0.
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4.2 Counterexample
We show that Claim 4.1 does not holds by a counterexample. Let p = 2, n =
3,K = GF(2), L = GF(23) and G = L×. Let α = g ∈ G be a generator of G
with minimal polynomial Ming(t) = t3 + t + 1 ∈ K[t]. Figure 3 is an execution
of the restricted version which does not give U the expected result.
(i) U : Picks a private key sk = x = 6 ∈ Z7, sets y = g2 + 1 and pk =
(7, g, y). (pk, sk) is a pair of public and private keys for the ElGamal
encryption scheme over group G. U sends pk to DB such that DB can
verify the validity of pk as an ElGamal public key. Clearly, g = G(α)
and y = Y (α) for polynomials G(t) = t, Y (t) = t2 + 1 ∈ K[t] of
degree less than 3. The field elements R ∈ L which satisfy equality
Y (R) = G(R)x are g, g2 and g2 + g.
(ii) U : For a polynomial function F (t) = g ∈ L[t], takes s = 6 ∈
Z7, r = 1 ∈ K and computes the ciphertext C = Enc(F (α) + r) =
(G(α)s, Y (α)s(F (α)+r)) = (g6, (g2 +1)6(g+1)) = (g2 +1, g2 +g)
and sends it to DB. Clearly, we have that V (t) = t2 + 1 and
W (t) = t2 + t.
(iii) DB: Sets the database block to be R = g2 + g ∈ G. After receiving the
ciphertextC = (g2+1, g2+g) from U ,DB checks thatC is a nontrivial
ElGamal ciphertext and computes C(R) = (V (R),W (R)) = (R2 +
1, R2 + R) = (g + 1, g2) by replacing each occurrence of α (resp. αl
for all power l < n) with R (resp. with Rl).
(iv) DB: Sends C(R) = (g + 1, g2) to U .
(v) U : Outputs Dec(sk,C(R)) − r = g2 + g as F (R), which is absurd
(since F (R) = g).
Figure 3. An execution of the restricted version
4.3 Failure Probability
We have seen that the restricted version may not give U the expected result in
Section 4.2. However, given the counterexample, we cannot conclude that the
Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol does not satisfy the correctness requirement de-
fined in Section 2.2. In fact, an EPIR protocol is said to be correct as long as
it always gives U the expected result for any fixed input (F (t), i) ∈ L[t] × [n]
except with a negligible probability. In other words, as a collection of probabilis-
tic algorithms, an EPIR protocol is allowed to fail with a negligible probability.
10 Yeow Meng Chee, Huaxiong Wang and Liang Feng Zhang
Therefore, to show that the Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol does not satisfy the
correctness requirement, it is necessary to compute the failure probability of the
protocol, i.e., the probability that the protocol does not give U the expected result.
In this section, we study the failure probability of the restricted version. We
show, through experimental results, that the restricted version does fail with large
probability for certain choices of F (t) (e.g., F (t) = g).
From now on, we fix p = 2 to be the characteristic of all related finite fields.
However, we stress that our methodology is applicable to any characteristic p.
Following the notations of Section 3.1 and Section 3.2, let K = GF(2) and L =
GF(2n) be the extension of K of degree n for an integer n ≥ 2. Let G = L× be the
multiplicative group of L of order q = 2n − 1 and g be a generator of G. W.l.o.g.,
we suppose α = g. Then G(t) = t ∈ K[t] is the polynomial of degree less than
n such that G(α) = g. For every x ∈ Zq, let Y (t) ∈ K[t] be the polynomial of
degree less than n such that Y (α) = y = gx. We define
D(t) = G(t)x + Y (t) = tx + Y (t) ∈ K[t].
Then the set of database blocks which satisfy the requirements imposed by Claim
4.1 (or in Section 3.2) is
Dn,g,x = {β ∈ G|D(β) = 0}.
We say that an execution of the restricted version is parameterized by (n, g, x, F,
s, r,R) if x ∈ Zq, F (t) ∈ L[t], s ∈ Zq, r ∈ K and R ∈ Dn,g,x are the private key,
the polynomial to be evaluated, the randomness used at step (ii) of the restricted
version and the database block held by DB, respectively. Let V (t),W (t) ∈ K[t]
be the polynomials of degree less than n such that V (g) = gs and W (g) =
ys(F (g) + r). Then the execution of the restricted version parameterized by
(n, g, x, F, s, r,R) gives U the expected result if and only if V (R) 6= 0 and
E(R) = 0, where
E(t) = W (t) + V (t)x(F (t) + r). (4.1)
For an execution of the restricted version parameterized by (n, g, x, F, s, r,R), we
define
Hx,s,r,F,R =
{
1 if V (R) 6= 0 and E(R) = 0,
0 otherwise.
Then the execution fails if and only if Hx,s,r,F,R = 0. Therefore, the probability
that an execution of the restricted version fails when x ∈ Zq is the private key and
F (t) ∈ L[t] is the polynomial chosen by U is exactly
ǫ(n, g, x, F ) = Pr [s← Zq, r ← K,R← Dn,g,x : Hx,s,r,F,R = 0] .
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Since s, r and R are uniformly distributed, we have that
ǫ(n, g, x, F ) =
∑
s∈Zq
∑
r∈K
∑
R∈Dn,g,x
(1−Hx,s,r,F,R)
2q · |Dn,g,x|
. (4.2)
The probability that the restricted version fails when F (t) ∈ L[t] is the polynomial
chosen by U is exactly
η(n, g, F ) =
1
q
∑
x∈Zq
ǫ(n, g, x, F ). (4.3)
The probabilities η(n, g, F ) for 2 ≤ n ≤ 9 and F (t) = g are quite large and
enumerated in Table 1.
n Ming(t) η(n, g, g) n Ming(t) η(n, g, g)
2 t2 + t+ 1 0.61111 6 t6 + t4 + t3 + t+ 1 0.87719
3 t3 + t+ 1 0.74271 7 t7 + t+ 1 0.87895
4 t4 + t+ 1 0.81537 8 t8 + t4 + t3 + t2 + 1 0.89809
5 t5 + t2 + 1 0.83630 9 t9 + t4 + 1 0.90358
Table 1. Failure probability
4.4 Bringer-Chabanne EPIR Protocol Fails Frequently When F (t) = g
In this section, we show that the restricted version fails with large probability when
F (t) = g. Specifically, for every integer n ≥ 2, we give lower bound on η(n, g, g).
We follow the notations in Section 4.3. For every j ∈ Zq, the set C = {j ·
2k mod q|k = 0, 1, 2, · · · } is called a cyclotomic coset mod q. By default, C is
represented by the smallest number u ∈ C and denoted as
Cu =
{
j · 2k mod q|k = 0, 1, 2, · · ·
}
.
The number u is called the coset representative of C. Clearly, all distinct cyclo-
tomic cosets mod q are pairwise disjoint and form a partition of Zq, i.e., Zq =⋃
u∈U Cu, where U is the set of coset representatives of all distinct cyclotomic
cosets mod q. For every positive integer d, we denote by N2(d) the number of
monic irreducible polynomials of degree d in K[t].
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Lemma 4.1. (Lidl and Niederreiter [25]) The following statements hold:
(i) For every u ∈ U , the cardinality of Cu is a divisor of n.
(ii) For every positive integer d|n, the number of cyclotomic cosets mod q of
cardinality d is N2(d).
(iii) For every integer d ≥ 2, we have that N2(d) ≤ 1
d
(2d − 2).
For every u ∈ U , we denote by
Du =
{
gj |j ∈ Cu
}
the set of field elements in L which share the same minimal polynomial over K
with gu. For every x ∈ Zq, it is clear that there is a subset Ux ⊆ U of coset
representatives such that
Dn,g,x =
⋃
u∈Ux
Du. (4.4)
Lemma 4.2. For every x ∈ Zq , we have that 1 ∈ Ux.
Proof. It follows from the fact that D(t) ∈ K[t] and D(g) = 0.
Due to (4.1), E(t) is determined by the parameters g ∈ G, x ∈ Zq, F (t) ∈
L[t], s ∈ Zq and r ∈ K. Next lemma shows that E(t) and D(t) only share a very
small number of roots in L when F (t) = g.
Lemma 4.3. Suppose F (t) = g. Then for every x ∈ Zq, u ∈ Ux, s ∈ Zq and
r ∈ K, either V (β) = 0 for every β ∈ Du or E(t) has at most one root in Du.
Proof. If V (gu) = 0, then V (g2j ·u) = V (gu)2j = 0 for any j ∈ N, i.e., V (β) = 0
for every β ∈ Du. Otherwise, we show that E(t) has at most one root in Du. Due
to (4.1), we have that
E(t) = W (t) + V (t)x(g + r).
Suppose that E(t) has two different roots in Du, say gu·2
j
and gu·2k , where 0 ≤
j < k < n. Then
W (gu·2
j
) + V (gu·2
j
)x(g + r) = 0 = W (gu·2k) + V (gu·2k)x(g + r).
It follows that
(g + r)2
n−j
= (W (gu)/V (gu)x)2
n
= (g + r)2
n−k
.
Since r ∈ K, the above equality implies g2n−j = g2n−k . Since g is primitive, we
have (2n−1)|(2n−j−2n−k). It follows that n|(k−j), which is a contradiction.
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The following lemma gives lower bound on ǫ(n, g, x, g) for any private key
x ∈ Zq.
Lemma 4.4. For every x ∈ Zq , we have that ǫ(n, g, x, g) ≥ 1−
|Ux|
|Dn,g,x|
.
Proof. Due to (4.2) and (4.4), we have that
ǫ(n, g, x, g) =
∑
s∈Zq
∑
r∈K
∑
R∈Dn,g,x
(1−Hx,s,r,g,R)
2q · |Dn,g,x|
=
∑
s∈Zq
∑
r∈K
∑
u∈Ux
∑
R∈Du
(1−Hx,s,r,g,R)
2q · |Dn,g,x|
.
Let s ∈ Zq and r ∈ K be arbitrary. Due to Lemma 4.3, for every u ∈ Ux, either
V (β) = 0 for every β ∈ Du, or E(t) has at most one root in Du. It follows that∑
R∈Du
(1−Hx,s,r,g,R) ≥ |Cu| − 1.
Therefore,
ǫ(n, g, x, g) ≥
∑
s∈Zq
∑
r∈K
∑
u∈Ux
(|Cu| − 1)
2q · |Dn,g,x|
= 1−
|Ux|
|Dn,g,x|
.
We want to bound ǫ(n, g, x, g) for various settings of n and x. As the first case,
we suppose that n is a prime and have the following lemma:
Lemma 4.5. If n is prime, then ǫ(n, g, x, g) > 1− 2
n
for every x ∈ Zq
Proof. Due to Lemma 4.1, |Cu| divides n for every x ∈ Zq and u ∈ Ux. Since n
is prime, we have that |Cu| = 1 or n.
(i) If |Ux| = 1, then Ux = {1} due to Lemma 4.2. It is obvious that |C1| = n.
By Lemma 4.4, we have
ǫ(n, g, x, g) ≥ 1−
|Ux|
|Dn,g,x|
= 1−
1
n
> 1−
2
n
.
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(ii) If |Ux| > 1 and 0 ∈ Ux, then we have that
ǫ(n, g, x, g) ≥ 1−
|Ux|
|Dn,g,x|
= 1−
|Ux|
1 + n(|Ux| − 1)
> 1−
2
n
.
(iii) If |Ux| > 1 and 0 /∈ Ux, then we have that
ǫ(n, g, x, g) ≥ 1−
|Ux|
|Dn,g,x|
= 1−
|Ux|
n · |Ux|
= 1−
1
n
> 1−
2
n
.
Below we lower bound ǫ(n, g, x, g) for any integer n ≥ 2 and private key
x ∈ Zq. For any positive integer d|n, we set
λx.d = |{u : u ∈ Ux and Cu is of cardinality d}|.
Due to Lemma 4.2 and the requirements on database block R (imposed by Claim
4.1), λx = (λx,d) belongs to the following set
Ψn = {z = (zd)d|n : 0 ≤ z1 ≤ 1; 1 ≤ zn ≤ N2(n);
0 ≤ zd ≤ N2(d) for d|n, 1 < d < n},
where the coordinates of λx and z are indexed by positive divisors of n. Due to
Lemma 4.4, we have that
ǫ(n, g, x, g) ≥ 1−
|Ux|
|Dn,g,x|
= 1−
∑
d|n λx,d∑
d|n dλx,d
. (4.5)
We turn to upper bound the following function
ψn(z) =
∑
d|n zd∑
d|n dzd
,
on Ψn. Because this is relatively hard, we turn to upper bound the function
φn(z) =
∑n
d=1 zd∑n
d=1 dzd
,
where z = (z1, . . . , zn) is taken from the following set
Φn = {z = (z1, . . . , zn) : 0 ≤ z1 ≤ 1; 1 ≤ zn ≤ N2(n);
0 ≤ zd ≤ N2(d) for 1 < d < n}.
Let ω(n) be the maximum value of φn(z) on Φn, i.e.,
ω(n) = max{φn(z) : z ∈ Φn}.
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Lemma 4.6. For every x ∈ Zq , we have that ǫ(n, g, x, g) ≥ 1− ω(n).
Proof. Clearly, ω(n) = max{φn(z) : z ∈ Φn} ≥ max{ψn(z) : z ∈ Ψn} ≥
ψn(λx). Due to (4.5), we have that ǫ(n, g, x, g) ≥ 1 − ψn(λx) ≥ 1 − ω(n) for
every x ∈ Zq.
Due to Lemma 4.6, it is sufficient to upper bound ω(n).
Lemma 4.7. Suppose that ω(n) = φn(ξ) for ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξn) ∈ Φn. Then ξ1 =
ξn = 1. Furthermore, if n ≥ 3, then there is an integer 1 < h < n such that
ξd = N2(d) for every integer 1 < d ≤ h and ξd = 0 for every integer h < d < n.
Proof. It is trivial to verify that ξ1 = ξ2 = 1 for n = 2. Let n ≥ 3.
(i) For every (0, z2, . . . , zn), (1, z2, . . . , zn) ∈ Φn, it is easy to see that
φn(0, z2, . . . , zn)− φn(1, z2, . . . , zn) < 0,
which implies that ξ1 = 1.
(ii) For every (1, z2, . . . , zn−1, zn), (1, z2, . . . , zn−1, 1) ∈ Φn (where zn > 1), it
is easy to see that
φn(1, z2, . . . , zn−1, zn)− φn(1, z2, . . . , zn−1, 1) < 0,
which implies that ξn = 1.
(iii) Suppose 0 < ξh < N2(h) for some integer 1 < h < n. Let
C1 =
h−1∑
d=1
ξd, C2 =
n∑
d=h+1
ξd, C3 =
h−1∑
d=1
dξd, C4 =
n∑
d=h+1
dξd.
Then due to the maximality of ω(n), we have that
0 ≥ φn(ξ1, . . . , ξh + 1, . . . , ξn)− φn(ξ)
=
C3 + C4 − hC1 − hC2
(C3 + h(ξh + 1) + C4)(C3 + hξh + C4)
;
0 ≥ φn(ξ1, . . . , ξh − 1, . . . , ξn)− φn(ξ)
=
−C3 − C4 + hC1 + hC2
(C3 + h(ξh − 1) + C4)(C3 + hξh + C4)
.
The above inequalities imply that C3 + C4 = hC1 + hC2. Hence, we have
h =
∑n
d=1 dξd∑n
d=1 ξd
=
1
ω(n)
.
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(iv) We claim that ξa = N2(a) for every 1 < a < h. Otherwise, by (iii), we have
that ξa = 0 and
ω(n) < φn(ξ1, . . . , ξa + 1, . . . , ξh − 1, . . . , ξn),
which is a contradiction.
(v) We claim that ξb = 0 for every h < b < n. Otherwise, by (iii), we have that
ξb = N2(b) and
ω(n) < φn(ξ1, . . . , ξh + 1, . . . , ξb − 1, . . . , ξn),
which is a contradiction.
(vi) Finally, we show that ω(n) = φn(1,N2(2), . . . ,N2(h), 0, . . . , 0, 1). Due to
(iii), (iv) and (v), we have that
ξ = (1,N2(2), . . . ,N2(h− 1), ξh, 0, . . . , 0, 1),
where 0 < ξh < N2(h). Since φn(ξ) = ω(n) ≥ φn(1,N2(2), . . . ,N2(h −
1), 0, 0, . . . , 0, 1), we have
hC1 − C3 ≤ n− h.
If hC1 − C3 < n− h, then
ω(n) < φn(1,N2(2), . . . ,N2(h), 0, . . . , 0, 1),
which is a contradiction. Therefore, hC1 − C3 = n − h.Then it is not hard
to verify that
ω(n) = φn(ξ) = φn(1,N2(2), . . . ,N2(h), 0, . . . , 0, 1).
Therefore, we could have taken ξ = (1,N2(2), . . . ,N2(h), 0, . . . , 0, 1).
Due to Lemma 4.7, for every integer n ≥ 3, there is at least one integer 1 <
h < n such that
ω(n) = φn(1,N2(2), . . . ,N2(h), 0, . . . , 0, 1). (4.6)
Note that the integer h may be not unique. For every integer n ≥ 3, we define
h(n) = min{h : ω(n) = φn(1,N2(2), . . . ,N2(h), 0, . . . , 0, 1),
where 1 < h < n}
(4.7)
to be the smallest integer 1 < h < n such that (4.6) holds. Next lemma shows that
h(n) is an increasing function of n.
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Lemma 4.8. We have that h(n+ 1) ≥ h(n) for every integer n ≥ 3.
Proof. Due to the definition of h(·) by (4.7), it is not hard to see that
φn(1,N2(2), . . . ,N2(l− 1),N2(l), 0, . . . , 0, 1) >
φn(1,N2(2), . . . ,N2(l − 1), 0, 0, . . . , 0, 1)
for every integer 2 ≤ l ≤ h(n). Equivalently, we have that
1
l
>
∑l−1
d=2 N2(d) + 2∑l−1
d=2 dN2(d) + n+ 1
(4.8)
for every integer 2 ≤ l ≤ h(n). Due to (4.8), it is not hard to verify that
φn+1(1,N2(2), . . . ,N2(l − 1),N2(l), 0, . . . , 0, 1) >
φn+1(1,N2(2), . . . ,N2(l− 1), 0, 0, . . . , 0, 1)
(4.9)
for every integer 2 ≤ l ≤ h(n). In particular, (4.9) holds for l = h(n). This
implies that h(n+ 1) ≥ h(n).
On the other hand, ω(n) is a decreasing function of n:
Lemma 4.9. We have that ω(n+ 1) < ω(n) for every integer n ≥ 3.
Proof. By Lemma 4.8, we have that h(n+ 1) ≥ h(n). If h(n+ 1) = h(n), then
ω(n+ 1) =
∑h(n+1)
d=2 N2(d) + 2∑h(n+1)
d=2 dN2(d) + n+ 2
=
∑h(n)
d=2 N2(d) + 2∑h(n)
d=2 dN2(d) + n+ 2
<
∑h(n)
d=2 N2(d) + 2∑h(n)
d=2 dN2(d) + n+ 1
= ω(n).
If h(n+ 1) > h(n), then
ω(n) =
∑h(n)
d=2 N2(d) + 2∑h(n)
d=2 dN2(d) + n+ 1
≥
1
h(n) + 1
≥
1
h(n+ 1)
>
∑h(n+1)
d=2 N2(d) + 2∑h(n+1)
d=2 dN2(d) + n+ 2
= ω(n+ 1),
where the first and third inequalities follow from the definition of h(·) by (4.7).
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n h(n) ω(n) n h(n) ω(n) n h(n) ω(n)
2 1 0.66667 12 4 0.24242 296 10 0.09996
3 1 0.50000 20 5 0.19718 522 11 0.09089
4 2 0.42857 34 6 0.16547 934 12 0.08332
5 2 0.37500 57 7 0.14236 1681 13 0.07692
6 2 0.33333 98 8 0.12478 3058 14 0.07143
7 3 0.31250 169 9 0.11101 5596 15 0.06667
Table 2. The values of h(n) and ω(n)
We enumerate the values of h(n) and ω(n) for some integers n in Table 2.
Lemma 4.10. For every integer n ≥ 7, we have that ω(n) ≥ 5
n+ 9 .
Proof. Due to Table 2 and Lemma 4.8, we have that h(n) ≥ 3 for every integer
n ≥ 7. It follows that ω(n) ≥ φn(1, 1, 2, 0, . . . , 0, 1) = 5/(n+ 9).
At last, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.11. We have that
η(n, g, g) ≥
{
1− ω(n) if 2 ≤ n ≤ 6 or n ≥ 7 is composite;
1− 2
n
if n ≥ 7 is prime.
Proof. Table 2 shows that ω(n) ≤ 2/n for every integer 2 ≤ n ≤ 6. Due
to Lemma 4.5 and Lemma 4.6, we have that ǫ(n, g, x, g) ≥ max{1 − 2/n, 1 −
ω(n)} = 1−ω(n) for n = 2, 3, 5, and ǫ(n, g, x, g) ≥ 1− ω(n) for n = 4, 6. Due
to (4.3), we have that
η(n, g, g) =
1
q
∑
x∈Zq
ǫ(n, g, x, g) ≥ 1− ω(n).
Due to Lemma 4.5, Lemma 4.6 and Lemma 4.10, we have that ǫ(n, g, x, g) ≥
max{1−2/n, 1−ω(n)} = 1−2/n if n ≥ 7 is prime and ǫ(n, g, x, g) ≥ 1−ω(n)
if n ≥ 7 is composite. Due to (4.3), we have that η(n, g, g) ≥ 1− 2/n if n ≥ 7 is
prime and η(n, g, g) ≥ 1− ω(n) if n ≥ 7 is composite.
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By Theorem 4.11, Lemma 4.9 and Table 2, we see that η(n, g, g) is always
non-negligible. Hence, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.12. The restricted version does not satisfy the correctness requirement
if F (t) = g.
4.5 Extension to A Set of Polynomials
In this section, we extend Theorem 4.12 to a set of polynomials F (t) ∈ L[t].
In particular, we follow the notations in Section 4.4 and show that the restricted
version does not satisfy the correctness requirement if F (t) ∈ P , where
P = {f(t) =
∑d
k=0 fkt
k : ∃ 0 ≤ l ≤ d such that fl ∈ L is primitive and fk ∈
K for every k 6= l}.
Note that the polynomial F (t) = g ∈ L[t] we studied in Section 4.4 is in P and
satisfies Lemma 4.3, which is critical for obtaining all subsequent lemmas and
theorems. Next lemma shows that Lemma 4.3 holds for any polynomial F (t) ∈ P
as well.
Lemma 4.13. Let F (t) ∈ P . Then for every x ∈ Zq, u ∈ Ux, s ∈ Zq and r ∈ K,
either V (β) = 0 for every β ∈ Du or E(t) has at most one root in Du.
Proof. If V (gu) = 0, then V (gu·2j ) = V (gu)2j = 0 for every j ∈ N, i.e., V (β) =
0 for every β ∈ Du. Otherwise, we have V (β) 6= 0 for every β ∈ Du. Suppose
F (t) =
∑d
k=0 Fkt
k
, where Fl ∈ L is of order q and Fk ∈ K for every k 6= l. We
show that E(t) has at most one root in Du, where
E(t) = W (t) + V (t)x(F (t) + r).
Suppose E(t) has two different roots in Du, say gu·2
a
and gu·2b , where 0 ≤ a <
b < n. Then
W (gu·2
a
)+V (gu·2
a
)x(F (gu·2
a
)+r) = 0 = W (gu·2b)+V (gu·2b)x(F (gu·2b)+r).
It follows that
(F (gu·2
a
) + r)2
n−a
= (F (gu·2
b
) + r)2
n−b
. (4.10)
Let c ∈ {a, b}. Then it is not hard to see that
(F (gu·2
c
) + r)2
n−c
=
l−1∑
k=0
Fkg
uk +
d∑
k=l+1
Fkg
uk + F 2
n−c
l g
ul + r.
Due to (4.10), we have that F 2n−al = F 2
n−b
l . Since Fl ∈ L is primitive, we have
(2n − 1)|(2n−a − 2n−b) and therefore n|(b− a), which is a contradiction.
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Due to Lemma 4.13, we note that all lemmas and theorems subsequent to
Lemma 4.3 in Section 4.4 can be generalized for any polynomial F (t) ∈ P . There-
fore, we have that
Theorem 4.14. The restricted version does not satisfy the correctness requirement
if F (t) ∈ P .
4.6 Extension to Any Characteristic p > 2
We have stressed in Section 4.3 that our methodology is applicable when the char-
acteristic of all related finite fields is any prime p. For example, it is obvious that
we have an analog of Lemma 4.6 for any characteristic p > 2. Let ωp(n) be an
analog of the function ω(n) when the characteristic of all related finite fields is a
prime p > 2. Then the following theorem holds as well.
Theorem 4.15. We have that η(n, g, g) ≥ 1 − ωp(n) for every integer n ≥ 2,
where g ∈ GF(pn) is primitive and p is an arbitrary prime number.
It follows that Theorem 4.14 also holds when the characteristic of all related
finite fields is any prime p > 2.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that the Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol does not satisfy
the correctness requirement. To simplify the argument, we give a restricted ver-
sion of the Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol . If the original protocol satisfies the
correctness requirement, then so does the restricted version. We show that the re-
stricted version fails frequently if the polynomial to be evaluated has some special
property. This allows us to get the expected conclusion, i.e., the Bringer-Chabanne
EPIR protocol does not satisfy the correctness requirement.
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